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ABSTRACT 
 
The Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration 
Act 2014 (the ‘Lobbying Act’) imposes tight restrictions on the campaigning and lobbying 
activities of civil society organisations in the UK, diminishing their capacity to represent the 
interests of working people and thus likely compounding the ‘representation gap’ within 
British workplaces. Along with austerity measures and employment law reforms, the 
legislation exempliﬁes the UK government’s attempts to shift the balance of power further 
towards employers. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In countries like the UK, the United States and Australia trade unions have traditionally 
been considered the primary source of employee representation (Dobbins and Dundon, 
2014). This representative model, however, has been in decline; increasingly workplaces 
are non-union, resulting in either an absence of representative structures, the creation of 
non-union mechanisms or a hybrid form of representation where union and non-union 
forms coexist (Gomez et al., 2011). Studies of worker representation, union and non-
union, and employment relations more generally, often have a workplace focus. However, 
employment relations actors also operate from outside of the traditional boundary of 
employing organisations. Trade unions, in particular, have long attempted to inﬂuence 
public policy in areas that affect their members through the ‘method of legal enactment’ 
(Webb and Webb, 1920). 
 
In the UK, for example, the Lobbying Act, which became law in January 2014, was the 
subject of intense lobbying from the Trade Union Congress (TUC), trade unions, charities 
and pressure groups. The Act contains three substantive components. Part One 
introduces a statutory register of ‘consultant lobbyists’ and a Registrar to enforce the 
requirements (House of Lords, 2013a). The third part, the focus of the concerns of many 
trade unions (e.g. UNISON and UNITE), reinforces the existing legal requirements obliging 
trade unions to keep accurate membership lists. Part Two of the Act, the focus of this 
article, regulates and restricts campaigning by non-political party bodies such as charities, 
trade unions and pressure groups during a ‘regulated period’ in the run up to parliamentary 
elections (House of Lords Library Note, 2013). This part of the Act has provoked 
widespread controversy, especially among civil society organisations (CSOs) and the TUC 
concerned that it will undermine their lobbying and campaigning activities on issues 
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affecting their constituents (House of Commons Library, 2014; House of Lords, 2013b). 
 
The provisions contained within Part Two of the Lobbying Act also have potentially 
important implications for work and employment relations, principally by compounding the 
‘representation gap’(Heery, 2009; Towers, 1997) in UK workplaces. Given the decline in 
traditional sources of worker voice there is growing interest in the role new employment 
relations actors, such as CSOs—including single issue campaign bodies, pressure groups, 
charities and community organisations— play in representing the interests of workers 
(Abbott, 2006; Bellemare, 2000; Williams et al., 2011), often by attempting to inﬂuence 
government policies at the level of the state (Heery et al., 2012). By imposing tight 
restrictions on the campaigning and lobbying activities of CSOs, the Lobbying Act 
potentially diminishes their capacity to represent the interests of their constituents as 
working people. Along with profound austerity measures (e.g. Taylor-Gooby, 2012) and 
the reform of employment law (Hepple, 2013), it constitutes a third, and hitherto neglected, 
dimension of the UK coalition government’s efforts to shift the balance of power in work 
and employment relationships further towards employers. 
 
The purpose of this article is to explore the likely effects of the Lobbying Act on the 
lobbying and campaigning activities of CSOs, with regard to a number of key questions. 
How will the Lobbying Act affect the ability of CSOs to provide their constituents with 
representation and voice at the level of the state? How could the Act affect joint working 
between CSOs on issues of concern to their supporters? Given the tighter controls, 
contained within the legislation, on the activities of CSOs during a ‘regulated period’, will 
this weaken their role as employment actors? Finally, in what potential ways could the 
legislation compound the ‘representation gap’? 
 
 
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS AND WORKER REPRESENTATION 
 
The dominant source of employee representation has traditionally been through trade 
unions (Gomez et al., 2011). Declining union membership and workplaces with a union 
presence have undermined this representative model (Van Wanrooy et al., 2013). The 
marginalisation of trade unions has led to growing interest in the emergence of a multiform 
system of worker representation and non-union forms of worker representation (Dobbins 
and Dundon, 2014; Heery, 2009; 2011). Although non-union forms of worker 
representation have remained stable in recent years there remains an absence of any 
representative arrangements in a large minority of workplaces, 37 per cent (Van Wanrooy 
et al., 2013: 66). In the 1990s, the decline of traditional workplace representative 
mechanisms led commentators (e.g. Towers, 1997) to highlight the emergence of a 
representation gap, an observation that remains relevant today. 
 
Towers (1997) identiﬁed established workplace representative structures and cooperative 
union–management relations as important approaches to bridging the representation gap. 
There is, however, growing awareness among industrial relations scholars of the activities 
of ‘new’ employment relations actors (e.g. Abbott, 2006; Bellemare, 2000), particularly 
their role in representing workers’ interests (Williams et al., 2011). For Kochan et al. 
(1994), the representation of workers’ interests and interaction between traditional 
employment actors occur at three levels. The bottom level relates to the workplace and the 
policies affecting workers, managers and unions on a day-to-day basis; the middle level 
relates to collective bargaining and human resource policies; and the top level is 
associated with strategic decision making, including political strategies and the policies of 
the state (Kochan et al., 1994). 
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Building on this work, Bellemare (2000) analyses the importance of non-traditional 
employment relations actors by focusing on their activities at the level of the workplace, 
organisation and state. In addition, an actor’s inﬂuence within the employment relations 
system can be gauged along two dimensions, instrumental and outcomes. The former 
refers to the extent to which an actor is active at the three levels, referred to above, and 
the latter, the ability to secure change by inﬂuencing other actors. Actors satisfying these 
two conditions—being involved in all three levels and able to institute change—are 
considered signiﬁcant (Bellemare, 2000). Inﬂuencing the state is an important activity for 
actors to undertake, because legislative changes can ﬁlter down to the workplace level, 
shaping and regulating employer behaviour and providing actors with leverage to inﬂuence 
employers and provide workers with voice (Bellemare, 2000; Kochan et al., 1994). 
 
Regarding the levels at which CSOs operate, Heery et al. (2004) characterise the activities 
of CSOs as being bifurcated, with one level relating to advising and representing individual 
workers and the other about representing workers’ interests at the level of the state 
through lobbying and campaigning work. Policy and campaigning work are long 
established practices of many CSOs and forms an important part of their work (Heery et 
al., 2012: 66). A signiﬁcant achievement for the National Group on Homeworking was 
securing the inclusion of home-workers in the 1999 legislation entitling them to the 
minimum wage (Holden, 2007). Less successful was the Fawcett Society’s challenge to 
the coalition government’s 2010 emergency budget on the grounds that it had 
disproportionately negative consequences for women (Conley, 2012). 
 
The activity of CSOs in campaigning and lobbying to inﬂuence the work and employment 
relations policies of governments is thus a key element of the emergent multiform system 
of worker representation identiﬁed by Heery (2011). CSOs can act as an important 
representative vehicle at the level of the state, expressing the voice and interests of often 
vulnerable sections of the workforce, who may lack the capacity to organise themselves. 
Since 2010, however, the UK coalition government has pursued a highly ambitious deﬁcit 
reduction programme, manifest in rapid restructuring and spending cuts with profound 
consequences for the delivery of welfare services (Taylor-Gooby, 2012), often with 
adverse consequences for such groups (e.g. Conley, 2012: 357; Grimshaw and Rubery, 
2012: 105; Hepple, 2013: 207). 
 
There is an emerging body of literature that critically assesses elements of the coalition’s 
work and employment relations policies, generally highlighting the adverse consequences 
of the reforms for working people based on a neo-liberal ideological stance, which 
privileges removing burdens on business, diluting employment protection laws and tilting 
the balance of power towards employers (e.g. Hepple, 2013; Jameson, 2012). Among 
other things, the coalition government has introduced employment tribunal fees—markedly 
reducing the number of claims made (see Ministry of Justice 2014)—extended the 
qualifying period to claim unfair dismissal from one to two years and removed legal aid 
from employment law cases (Grimshaw and Rubery, 2012; Hepple, 2013; Jameson, 
2012). The effect of these reforms has been to restrict workers’ access to representation 
and to discourage them from pursuing tribunal cases (Hepple, 2013). 
 
Whereas the legislation referred to above has an individual dimension, Part Two of the 
Lobbying Act has a number of potential employment implications for new and established 
actors. The tighter restrictions imposed by the Act may affect the ability of employment 
relations actors to undertake joint work, mobilise and organise their supporters to 
campaign and lobby against government policies. These are key tactics employed by 
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unions and CSOs to secure change and gains for their constituents; tighter controls in 
relation to these activities, however, may undermine their effectiveness and importance as 
employment actors. A further potentially damaging effect of the Lobbying Act is that it may 
compound the representation gap, as CSOs become more cautious about the nature of 
the issues that they campaign on, therefore limiting the issues on which they can give 
voice and representation to workers and the channels of support that workers can access. 
 
 
THE LOBBYING ACT, PART TWO 
 
The Lobbying Act came into UK law in January 2014, following a period of considerable 
political interest in the activities of lobbyists. An important motivation for further legislation 
was the concern that there was a lack of transparency in relation to lobbying activity 
(House of Lords Library Note, 2013). The pre-existing legal framework governing 
charitable organisations covered political lobbying and campaigning efforts by charities. 
They can engage in political activity, such as campaigning for a change in the law, as long 
as it is in furtherance of their charitable objectives, they maintain their independence and 
the campaigning does not become their sole interest (Charity Commission, 2008). 
 
Moreover, the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA), already 
controls third party spending and the activities they can undertake during an election 
period (Citizens Advice Bureau, 2013). Many of the provisions contained within PPERA 
have been incorporated into the Lobbying Act (see Table 1). It regulates ‘controlled 
expenditure’ by a ‘third party’ on ‘election material’ during a ‘relevant period’. It is this 
system of control, within PPERA, which Part Two of the Lobbying Act amends, tightens 
and expands during the ‘relevant period’ before a General Election (House of Lords, 
2013a). A ‘third party’ is deﬁned in s85(8) PPERA as any person, or organisation, that 
campaigns in elections and undertakes controlled expenditure but are not standing as 
political parties or candidates themselves (House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Committee, 2014: 9). ‘Controlled expenditure’ by a third party means expenses 
incurred by, or on behalf of, the third party in connection with the publication of ‘election 
material’ made available to the public during a ‘relevant period’ that ‘can reasonably be 
regarded as intended to promote or procure electoral success’ [sections 85(2) and 87 
PPERA]. Similarly, section 85(3) PPERA deﬁnes ‘election material’ as: ‘material which can 
reasonably be regarded as intended to promote or procure electoral success’ of a party or 
candidate at an election (House of Lords, 2013c; House of Lords Library Note, 2013: 17; 
Hutchins and Baston, 2014). 
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The Lobbying Bill was criticised for the speed with which it was taken through Parliament, 
providing little opportunity for detailed pre-legislative scrutiny (House of Lords, 2013c; 
TUC, 2013). Although the government did institute a six-week pause to allow for wider 
consultation on Part Two, this did little to allay the concerns of the Bill’s critics 
(Commission on Civil Society and Democratic Engagement, 2013a; House of Commons 
Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 2014). CSOs were already concerned 
about the potential restrictions under PPERA. The prospect of further limitations, as 
manifest in the Lobbying Bill, particularly additional reporting requirements, reduced 
spending caps and the broadening of the meaning of ‘controlled expenditure’, exacerbated 
their anxieties (Citizens Advice Bureau, 2013: 2; Commission on Civil Society and 
Democratic Engagement, 2013b: 6; Oxfam, 2013: 1). 
 
There are ﬁve main features of the Lobbying Act Part Two: 
 
1. Regulated period: This refers to the time period that pre-election campaigning rules 
apply, for example in relation to national spending limits. The Bill originally proposed 
a 12-month regulated period for the May 2015 general election. However, during the 
Bill’s Report Stage in the House of Lords, the government shortened the regulated 
period for the May 2015 general election so that it starts on 19 September 2014 
rather than 23 May 2014 (Hutchins and Baston, 2014). See Table 1 for a breakdown 
by nation state. 
 
2. Controlled expenditure and regulated activities: Controlled expenditure speciﬁes the 
activities that could inﬂuence the outcome of an election for a party or a candidate. 
Schedule three of the Act expands the list of regulated activities, beyond those in 
PPERA, that count as ‘controlled expenditure’ during the ‘regulated period’ when 
incurred by third parties for election purposes (Compact Voice, 2013; House of 
Lords, 2013a; House of Lords Library Note, 2013). ‘Controlled expenditure’ now 
extends to not only include written material made available to the public but also 
public rallies, public meetings, market research, advertising, press conferences, 
transport and some stafﬁng costs (Compact Voice, 2013; House of Lords Library 
Note, 2013; Hutchins and Baston, 2014). 
 
3. Registration threshold: This relates to the amount of money that a CSO can spend 
before it has to register with the Electoral Commission. Reﬂecting the broader 
deﬁnition of ‘controlled expenditure’ clause 27(1) was amended to increase the 
registration threshold, for example in England, from £10,000 to £20,000 (Hutchins 
and Baston, 2014). See Table 1 for a breakdown. 
 
4. National and constituency spending limits: Clause 27(2) limits the amount that can be 
spent nationally and in a particular constituency during the regulated period. The Act 
reduces the total amount that non-party campaigners can spend on ‘election material’ 
during the regulated period prior to a UK General Election from £988,500 to 
£450,000 across the UK (Commission on Civil Society and Democratic Engagement, 
2013b; Hutchins and Baston, 2014). See Table 1 for a breakdown by nation state. 
Similarly, Clause 28 of the Lobbying Act introduces a constituency spending limit 
restricting the amount that can be spent campaigning in a constituency to £9,750 
during the regulated period by non-party campaigners (Commission on Civil Society 
and Democratic Engagement, 2013b; House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Committee, 2014). 
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5. Reporting requirements: The Lobbying Act also introduces additional administrative 
and reporting requirements for third party campaigners. Under PPERA campaigners 
were required to report donations towards regulated spending after polling day. 
However, Clause 32 of the Lobbying Act now requires a registered third party to 
provide quarterly reports of donations over £7,500 in the year before a UK 
parliamentary election covered by ‘controlled expenditure’. After the dissolution of 
Parliament registered third parties also have to provide weekly reports on donations 
over £7,500 (Commission on Civil Society and Democratic Engagement, 2013b). 
Breaches of the legislation, for example failure to register or submit a report, can 
result in criminal or civil penalties (Hutchins and Baston, 2014). 
 
The Lobbying Act has parallels with, for example, the employment legislation of the 1980s 
in that it has a collective dimension and is motivated by a concern to increase 
transparency and accountability regarding the internal affairs of employment relations 
actors. Similarly, it also attempts to restrict the activities of organisations representing the 
interests of working people by tightening controls over their actions, imposing additional 
administration and the threat of sanctions for breaches of the law. A likely effect of the 
Lobbying Act is that CSOs will become more cautious, so as not to breach the law, 
regarding their activities, an outcome that has been documented in relation to the effects 
of the 1980s legislation on trade union activities (Gospel and Palmer, 1993). 
 
A key distinction between the union legislation of the 1980s and the Lobbying Act is that 
the former targeted the activities of trade unions. The current legislation has much wider 
employment relations implications as it encompasses the activities of traditional and non-
traditional employment relations actors. This is potentially even more damaging for worker 
voice given the weakness of the labour movement; many workplaces are non-union, 
resulting in workers becoming more reliant on non traditional employment actors. 
However, the activities of these new employment actors are also affected by the Lobbying 
Act; the likely impact being a compounding of the representation gap, as established and 
new actors ﬁnd their activities increasingly regulated.  
 
 
METHODS 
 
For the purpose of this article, secondary data-collected in 2013–2014 were amassed 
using desk-based methods. The purpose was to ascertain the effects of Part Two of the 
Lobbying Act on CSOs’ ability to represent their constituents’ interests at the level of the 
state. To begin with the websites of CSOs with a history of campaigning and lobbying, 
such as Oxfam, Citizens Advice (CAB) and the National Council of Voluntary 
Organisations (NCVO) and labour movement organisations, such as the TUC and 
individual unions (e.g. UNISON and UNITE), were accessed. Website searches using 
keywords such as ‘lobbying’ and ‘transparency’ were undertaken to identify relevant 
documents relating to the legislation. 
 
Searches of union websites revealed the leading role played by the TUC in opposing Part 
Two and Three of the Bill, whereas the focus of individual unions’ opposition to the Bill was 
Part Three. Unions were particularly concerned about the additional reporting 
requirements placed on them to maintain accurate membership lists by Part Three of the 
Bill and the threats this posed to the privacy of their members. This requirement coincided 
with the revelations of blacklisting of union members, which may explain their focus on this 
aspect of the legislation (TUC, 2013). 
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Data collection was assisted by the creation, in September 2013, of the Commission on 
Civil Society and Democratic Engagement, which was established in response to the lack 
of government consultation and concerns relating to Part Two of the Lobbying Bill. The 
Commission, chaired by Lord Harries, consisted of over 150 prominent charities, campaign 
groups, community groups and online networks (Commission on Civil Society and 
Democratic Engagement, 2013a; Hutchins and Baston, 2014: 3). It sought responses, 
written and oral, from CSOs on the likely effects of Part Two of the Bill on their lobbying 
and campaigning activities. Thirty-two CSOs gave written evidence to the Commission in 
total during October and November 2013.  
 
At the same time, a series of meetings around the UK was convened with between 8 and 
18 CSO representatives attending each event. They were chaired by a representative of 
the Commission, who facilitated discussion on the likely impact of the Lobbying Bill on the 
activities of CSOs. The written and oral evidence covered the type of lobbying and 
campaigns that CSOs typically undertake during election periods but would be unable to 
perform under the new legislation. Other areas covered related to the effects of the 
spending limits and the monitoring and registration requirements on CSOs. The evidence 
submitted was collated and written up in two reports, which were published in October and 
December respectively. These were put in the public domain. Along with the written and 
oral submissions mentioned above, and the transcript soft hear fore-mentioned meetings, 
these reports were accessed by the researchers via the Commission’s website. Analysis of 
the material focused on identifying and categorising key themes, including the greater 
legal uncertainty, the burden of the additional administrative duties and the implications of 
lower spending limits, which emerged from the data. 
 
CSOs providing the Commission with information included organisations campaigning on a 
range of issues including: employment, environmental, mental health, poverty and the 
rights of women. These issues are often interconnected with employment; poverty is 
intricately connected to low pay, gendered and precarious work. Some CSOs, such as the 
NCVO, were umbrella organisations with over 10,000 members representing the interests 
of large, established CSOs; and small voluntary and community groups involved at the 
local level. In this respect, the evidence submitted, and the associated reports, are based 
on a wide constituency of CSOs, not just those attending meetings or submitting evidence 
themselves. 
 
Oral evidence was also given to Parliament by Members of Parliament and the House of 
Lords during October 2013, as well as by representatives of the voluntary sector. The 
transcripts of these presentations were accessed via the Commission’s website. The 
authors also monitored the legislative progress of the Lobbying Bill as it passed through 
the various stages in the House of Commons and House of Lords. Transcripts of 
parliamentary debates relating to the Lobbying Act were downloaded and analysed, as 
were reports relating to the Bill produced by various parliamentary committees, such as 
the Joint Select Committee on Human Rights. 
 
 
REGULATING LOBBYING AND CAMPAIGNING: CIVIL SOCIETY RESPONSES TO 
THE LOBBYING ACT 
 
One important theme in CSO responses to the Lobbying Act was that government 
concerns about the nature of the problem were misplaced, as there was little evidence of 
non-party campaigners inﬂuencing the outcome of elections. In this respect, the point was 
made by a representative from the Association of Charitable Foundations that: 
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The Government has failed to produce any concrete evidence that the current regime concerning non-party 
campaigning is inadequate, and particularly that there has been undue inﬂuence from the charity sector . . . 
or from other civil society organisation. 
 
This kind of response echoes the criticisms of the Conservative government’s trade union 
reforms in the 1980s and the coalition government’s employment law reforms, which is 
that legislative changes are based not on empirical evidence, but the perceptions and 
anecdotes of employers (e.g. Hepple, 2013; Wedderburn, 1985). That said, the main 
concerns articulated by CSOs about the Lobbying Act relate to the potentially adverse 
impact of greater legal uncertainty, lower spending limits, lengthy regulated periods, and 
additional monitoring and reporting requirements, all of which are anticipated to inhibit their 
ability to represent the interests of ordinary people, at the level of the state, through their 
campaigning and coalition working.  
 
 
1 Legal uncertainty 
 
The lack of consultation over the legislation contributed to widespread uncertainty and 
confusion among charities and campaigning groups about the Lobbying Act, in particular 
which activities would be regulated during an election period. There is considerable 
uncertainty around Part Two, which focuses on non-party campaigning; for example the 
meaning of ‘election material’ and ‘controlled expenditure’, given the broad and ambiguous 
wording of the Lobbying Act (Compact Voice, 2013: 1). The effect of extending the 
activities considered to be ‘controlled expenditure’ is that almost anything a CSO does in 
relation to advocating policies during a regulated period can be considered as potentially 
affecting the success or failure of particular parties or candidates. According to guidance 
provided by the Electoral Commission this could include: a leaﬂet identifying candidates 
that have adopted a particular policy position, a campaign calling for legislation to be 
repealed and a long-term campaign on a policy issue, such as the living wage, 
subsequently adopted by a political party. All of these activities could be interpreted as 
supporting a particular party or candidate. According to a CSO campaigning for disability 
rights: 
 
. . . the ambiguity that this legislation creates makes it virtually impossible for us as an organisation to 
determine whether or not activities during an election period could be argued to fall within the scope of the 
new regulatory framework. 
 
Such uncertainty, combined with criminal sanctions for non-compliance, is likely to deter 
CSOs from campaigning on public policy issues, therefore making it difﬁcult to represent 
the interests of their constituents (TUC, 2013). According to a representative of a CSO 
representing students’ interests, the effect is likely to be: 
 
. . . a kind of chill factor, where people are on the side of caution all the time, to the point where they are well 
within the right to be doing what they are, but they are not doing it and failing their members, their 
membership organisations; failing the interest that they represent. 
 
Legislation in the 1980s designed to control the activities of trade unions in relation to 
industrial action had a similar effect in that it made unions more circumspect about 
engaging in disputes, so as to avoid exposing their funds to possible sequestration 
(Gospel and Palmer, 1993). 
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2 CSOs and lobbying 
 
Participating in the political process by campaigning and advocating policy changes to 
inﬂuencing government policy, at local and national level, is a vital part of the work of 
CSOs (Heery et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2011). Many CSOs expressed concern that the 
Lobbying Act will jeopardise their ability to represent constituents’ interests by deter ring 
them from engaging in dialogue with government bodies during a regulated period on 
issues of concern to their constituents (Citizens Advice Bureau, 2013; Commission on Civil 
Society and Democratic Engagement, 2013b; Oxfam, 2013). A CSO campaigning for the 
rights of disabled people suggested that a consequence of the new regulatory regime 
would: 
 
. . . be to diminish the participation of voluntary sector organisations . . . in the democratic process and 
threatens our ability to represent disabled people. 
 
Other CSOs described campaigns that they had previously undertaken, such as 
encouraging MPs to make a pledge on a particular policy issue, and how they would be 
difﬁcult to replicate on the same scale in the new regulatory environment. A CSO 
campaigning on environmental issues acknowledged that: 
 
As more activities involved in this campaign would count towards ‘controlled expenditure’ and the thresholds 
are lower, it is likely that under the new proposals the same campaign would be subject to regulation and we 
would need to drastically scale back on this activity, reducing its impact. 
 
Similarly, the TUC (2013) expressed concerns that the new regulatory environment would 
undermine their ability to organise national events, such as the national demonstrations 
against pension reforms and the coalition’s austerity measures. The concern was that 
such activities would be considered as third party campaigning and that the costs 
associated with organising such national events would breach the spending limits. 
Arguably of greater concern is the view that CSOs, and trade unions, would become more 
precautionary, wary of campaigning on more controversial issues. According to one 
organisation: 
 
All of our campaigning would be made more difﬁcult . . . We would be particularly concerned about work on 
contentious policy areas such as support for human rights which would undoubtedly divide candidates in a 
constituency. 
 
By campaigning in favour of human rights legislation, in a situation where some politicians 
are in favour and some against, this could be interpreted within the legislation as 
supporting politicians, or parties, advocating stronger human rights to the disadvantage of 
those with opposing views. 
 
In oral evidence, provided in Parliament to the Commission on Civil Society and 
Democratic Engagement, Baroness Mallalieu suggested that in government there is:  
 
a weariness of dealing with pressure from pressure groups; [a] feeling that charities should not be 
campaigning, but dealing with their charitable purpose. 
 
This is consistent with the work of Hilton et al. (2013) who argue that the coalition 
government distinguishes between CSOs that simply engage in volunteering, perhaps 
helping to ﬁll the gaps brought about by government spending cuts and thus viewed as 
benign, and those more critical campaigning and rights-based CSOs, which engage in the 
political process, holding politicians to account. 
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3 CSOs and coalition working 
 
A key tactic employed by CSOs to inﬂuence public policy debates is working in coalition. 
Indeed, CSOs and trade unions have an established history of joint working on 
employment issues (Abbott, 1998). However, CSO representatives expressed concerns 
that the Lobbying Act will deter them from working in coalition and campaigning for policy 
changes during regulated periods. This is because of uncertainty around whether or not 
their activities fall within the scope of the new regulations and therefore possibly breach 
the law (Citizens Advice Bureau, 2013; Commission on Civil Society and Democratic 
Engagement, 2013b: 11; Compact Voice, 2013: 2). The high level of interaction between 
CSOs when engaged in campaigning activity—in the form of coalitions and partnerships—
has been documented by Heery et al. (2012). Given the importance attached to joint 
working by CSOs, any restrictions on this activity seem likely to impinge on their ability to 
represent their constituents’ interests. 
 
Under PPERA, organisations campaigning and working in coalition on the same issues are 
liable to contribute to one another’s spending limits. This has been retained within the 
Lobbying Act, meaning that each constituent member has to account for the full amount 
spent for the joint campaign, regardless of their individual contribution, as the total amount 
spent counts towards the individual spending limit of each campaigner (House of 
Commons Library, 2014: 5). In effect, the new legislation treats coalitions as single 
campaign bodies rather than a collection of multiple entities. This could result in 
organisations exceeding the national and constituency spending limits, which would be a 
criminal offence. The concern of CSO representatives, and the TUC, is that this could 
result in the break-up of coalitions, or the silencing of groups, particularly smaller groups, 
during an election period, given that they may opt not to engage in lobbying and 
campaigning activities for fear of falling foul of the administrative and ﬁnancial 
requirements contained within the legislation (TUC, 2013). 
 
CSOs also reported that many larger organisations may be deterred from coalition working 
because in joining too many they may soon reach their spending limit, particularly with the 
inclusion of staff costs, which make up a large proportion of spending. Recognising this, a 
CSO working in the area of international development reported that: 
 
At the moment expenditure by coalitions is aggregated (this means that each member has to account for the 
full amount spent for the joint campaign, regardless of their individual contribution). This requirement is 
already problematic for many organisations and as a result of the lowered spending threshold will force the 
larger organisations to leave many joint campaigns, while also deterring smaller charities and voluntary 
organisations to work together for fear of dealing with the ﬁnancial and administrative burden. 
 
The problem with aggregating coalition costs is that it makes it very difﬁcult to monitor the 
spending of other organisations, as each organisation has to take responsibility for the 
overall amount. The administrative framework required to do this, and the associated 
costs, may dissuade CSOs from participating in coalition work. In addition, smaller CSOs 
often beneﬁt from the support of larger organisations, with their greater resources, to 
advance their objectives. Given the wariness of larger CSOs to engage in coalition under 
the new regulatory regime, it could result in the voices of already marginalised groups in 
society going increasingly unheard. Recognising this, an international CSO tackling the 
effects of poverty indicated:  
 
There are a lot of organisations in the coalition which would not alone be able to campaign, they wouldn’t 
have the resources. So the bigger organisations take the lead. The concern would be that the smaller 
organisations would be even less relevant than they currently are. 
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CSOs may increasingly be obliged to work in isolation, undermining their effectiveness 
when it comes to campaigning to inﬂuence policy makers and representing constituents’ 
interests, given the likely lower breadth of support gained from joint working. 
 
Therefore, CSOs may become more circumspect and selective around the campaigns 
they support. This could lead to reluctance to campaign on a particular issue for some, or 
all, of the regulated period before an election, therefore limiting their ability to represent the 
interests of constituents on key policy issues. According to evidence provided by a CSO 
representing the interests of pensioners the effect of the Lobbying Act: 
 
Could be that, despite our determination to represent the interest of pensioners, especially during election 
campaigns, our national ofﬁcers and national council will consider this to present so many problems and be 
such an onerous extra duty on the part of our staff that it would be best to withdraw from campaigning during 
such election campaigns, for we know that the Registrar can take legal action against organisations which 
are late with returns. 
 
The effectiveness of CSOs’ coalition working, and their constituency campaigns, is likely to 
be undermined given that compliance with the spending regulations, particularly 
monitoring and reporting, will reduce their capacity as resources will be directed to meeting 
administrative requirements rather than representing constituents’ needs. A concern is that 
the considerable administrative burdens that the legislation imposes on CSOs will have a 
deleterious effect on their ability to engage in campaigning activities. According to Oxfam: 
 
Many of these organisations are quite small and have limited administrative capacity. Some of them are 
concerned that the time taken to work out the potential costs of a campaign or action and whether they’d 
need to register would prohibit them from undertaking that action in the ﬁrst place. . . . They feel the 
administrative burden might be too high and may restrict their activities in order to avoid registering. 
 
Supposedly to alleviate such concerns the Lobbying Act allows CSOs to register with the 
Electoral Commission as ‘lead campaigners’ enabling them to take responsibility for 
reporting spending on behalf of minor campaigners who are part of the coalition, providing 
that the minor campaigner does not exceed the spending limit (Hutchins and Baston, 
2014). 
 
 
4 Regulated period and regulatory burdens 
 
Elections, with increased levels of media and public interest, provide CSOs with leverage 
to pressure key decision makers to establish a position on a particular issue, such as the 
living wage and the privatisation of public services. CSOs are well placed to inﬂuence, and 
engage in, public policy debates as they have considerable expertise based on research 
evidence gained from providing services and working directly with constituents (Williams et 
al., 2011). Although the regulated period has been shortened for the May 2015 UK 
General Election there are concerns that organisations will be forced to limit campaigning 
activity over extended periods. This is problematic given the potentially uncertain timings 
of elections and referenda are not deﬁnitely ﬁxed, meaning that: 
 
. . . an overly extended regulatory period could leave some charities and civil society organisations in a 
perpetual state of uncertainty and have a chilling effect, restricting their ability to pursue their charitable 
objectives [Association of Charitable Foundations]. 
 
Therefore, the lobbying and campaigning activities of CSOs are likely to be increasingly 
intermittent, due to the staggering of referendums and elections (national and devolved), 
further diluting their continuity of action in the sphere of work and employment relations 
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which, as Bellemare (2000) has argued, is important to secure change and determine the 
importance of an actor. Even if elections proceed as planned, between 2014 and 2020, the 
time periods contained within the Lobbying Act will mean that campaigning restrictions will 
apply in 35 months, nearly 60 per cent of the time (NCVO, 2013). 
 
It is somewhat ironic that the Act was originally intended to bring about greater 
transparency to the lobbying sector. However, the legislation adopts a narrow deﬁnition of 
lobbying, conﬁning it to the registration of consultant lobbyists, which it is estimated will 
only cover 1 per cent of lobbying meetings (House of Lords, 2013a; House of Lords Library 
Note, 2013; TUC, 2013). The view was expressed that focusing on the lobbying activities 
of CSOs was misplaced as: 
 
Transparency is not just an issue in relation to third-party campaigning. The question should focus upon the 
inﬂuence of lobbying more generally and the role of large multinational corporations and how they inﬂuence 
government . . . 
 
In this respect, the legislation shifts the power in the employment relationship further in 
favour of the employer by doing little to make corporations more accountable for lobbying, 
by leaving them largely untouched, while placing restrictions on those organisations that 
seek to represent the interests of the vulnerable.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The marginalisation of trade unions has resulted in increased interest in non-union forms 
of worker representation, particularly internal non-union representative structures 
operating at the level of the workplace and organisation (Dobbins and Dundon, 2014). This 
interest has expanded to include non-union representative mechanisms external to 
organisations, which are principally active at the level of the state (Heery et al., 2012). 
 
This article offers two key insights into what the Lobbying Act portends for the 
‘representation gap’, within an emerging ‘multiform’ system of worker representation 
(Heery, 2011), in which CSOs have become increasingly prominent. First, it highlights the 
importance of viewing the Lobbying Act within the context of the UK coalition government’s 
broader efforts to rebalance work and employment relationships further towards 
employers. Existing work has already focused on the adverse consequences of austerity 
measures for working people (e.g. Conley, 2012; Taylor-Gooby, 2012), and the deleterious 
implications of the neo-liberal programme of employment law deregulation, which has 
been pursued by the coalition (e.g. Hepple, 2013). 
 
Our research, though, highlights a third dimension of the coalition’s efforts to reform the 
system of work and relations in the UK. The combined effects of the Lobbying Act, such as 
restrictions on campaigning, and the coalition’s other reforms, including the removal of 
employment from the scope of legal aid and the introduction of employment tribunal fees 
(Hepple, 2013; Ministry of Justice, 2014) will further limit the channels of voice and 
representation that workers can access. Therefore the Lobbying Act seems likely to 
compound the difﬁculties workers face in trying to advance their interests. CSOs generally 
lack the capacity to organise and mobilise workers within an employing organisation; they 
are reliant on the ‘leverage’ that legislation provides to regulate employment practices 
(Bellemare, 2000: 398; Kochan et al., 1994: 18). Where employment protection is eroded 
and tighter controls are placed on the ability of CSOs to provide their constituents with 
voice and representation, this leverage is weakened. 
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Taken together, the Coalition’s programme of employment deregulation and tighter 
regulation of CSOs’ activities, through the provisions of the Lobbying Act, undermine the 
capacity of CSOs to represent workers at the level of the state. Not only do they make it 
more difﬁcult to protect workers’ interests through the ‘method of legal enactment’ (Webb 
and Webb, 1920), but also they diminish the capacity of workers to assert their rights at 
work. This points to the second main contribution of the article, which is to show how the 
Lobbying Act, by imposing greater restrictions on the campaigning and lobbying activities 
of CSOs, seems likely to exacerbate the representation gap in UK workplaces. 
 
In the context of Bellemare’s (2000) framework, the Lobbying Act seems likely to erode the 
effectiveness of CSOs, and thus diminish their importance as industrial relations actors as 
they will ﬁnd it increasingly difﬁcult to satisfy the instrumental dimension (active at all three 
levels and continuity of action) and the outcome dimension (securing change). The 
legislation undermines the representative capacity of CSOs, quelling the voices of those 
who would otherwise beneﬁt from their interventions, such as employees working in non-
union ﬁrms. For these workers CSOs provide an important source of voice and 
representation. Whereas the legislation of the 1980s targeted and made it more difﬁcult for 
organised labour to represent members’ collective interests (Gospel and Palmer, 1993), 
the Lobbying Act mirrors this approach by imposing and extending tighter controls on 
campaigning and coalition working of established and emerging channels of worker voice. 
Part Two of the Lobbying Act in all likelihood will deter CSOs from engaging in coalition 
working and from operating at the level of the state, both of which are important channels 
they use to exert pressure and secure policy changes supportive of working people (Heery 
et al., 2012; Williams et al., 2011). Similarly, the lengthy ‘regulated period’ prior to an 
election, and associated administrative costs, will discourage CSOs from engaging in 
public policy debates and campaigning for policy changes over extended periods of time. 
Where they continue to engage in campaigning and lobbying efforts at national level they 
are likely to be fewer in number, more cautious and more desirous of avoiding contentious 
issues to ensure compliance with the new regulatory regime. As their interventions in 
relation to work and employment relationships become ever more intermittent, levels of 
engagement will diminish, as will continuity of action. Overall, these outcomes seem likely 
to have a pronounced adverse effect on worker representation. 
 
Clearly, further research into how the new law is working and its effects on employment 
actors, post-2015 general election, needs to be undertaken to consider the implications of 
changes in the legislative and policy frameworks and how they inﬂuence the ability of 
CSOs to campaign and lobby on matters relating to work and employment relations. 
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